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Cash breeds Success:
The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of cash constraints on equilibrium winning proba-
bilities in a patent race between an incumbent and an entrant. We develop a model
where cash-constrained firms finance their R&D expenditures with an investor who
cannot verify their eﬀort. In equilibrium, the incumbent faces better prospects of
winning the race the less cash-constrained he is and the more cash-constrained the
entrant is. We use NBER evidence from pharmaceutical patents awarded between
1975 and 1999 in the US, patent citations, and COMPUSTAT and fit probabilis-
tic regressions of the predicted equilibrium winning probabilities on measures of
the incumbent’s and potential entrants’ financial wealth. The empirical findings
support our theoretical predictions.
Keywords: Patent Race, incumbent, entrant, financial constraints, empirical
estimation.
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Do a firm’s financing constraints aﬀect its decisions to pursue innovation? Since Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen’s (1988) seminal paper, economists have found that financing matters
through various channels for total firm level investment in R&D. For example, Hall (1992)
shows that the source of financing matters and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) show that
internal finance predicts R&D expenditures of small high tech firms. But do a firm’s financing
constraints also aﬀect its rivals’ decisions to pursue innovations?
To our surprise, the role of financing constraints in patent races has not yet been studied,
neither theoretically nor empirically. Theorists have studied thoroughly how firms’ incentives
to engage in R&D depend on technological standing and market structure. Reinganum (1983)
shows that incumbent firms have less incentives to innovate than entrants in a stochastic
setup because additional investments in R&D speed up the cannibalization of their current
monopoly profits. Opposing this view, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show that incumbents
can preempt entrants from racing for incremental innovations if the player who spends most
is guaranteed to innovate with probability one. In this paper, we incorporate financing
constraints explicitly into the model of Reinganum (1983) and test the model’s predictions
empirically.
In our model, entrepreneurs will finance their R&D expenditures partly from internal
funds, and partly using external sources depending on the amount of cash they have. The
probability of making the discovery at a point in time depends on the eﬀort exerted by the
entrepreneur, which cannot be verified by the investor. Thus, in equilibrium, finance is costly
for the entrepreneur and the marginal cost of innovative activity is increasing in the fraction
of outside funds to the total investment, very much following the logic proposed by Jensen
and Meckling (1976). The increase in the marginal cost of innovating shifts a player’s best
response function in the patent race monotonically, which in turn results in a monotonic
change in the equilibrium R&D expenditures. The practical upshot is that in a setting of
strategic interactions, financial standing power is a source of comparative advantage. It is
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this prediction that we test in our empirical investigation.
We face three major empirical challenges. First, we need data on financial standing and
patent awards, but existing data sets typically contain information on either finance or
patents only. Therefore, we construct a data set that combines both. We use the NBER
Patent Citations Data File developed by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2002), which records all
utility patents granted in the United States between 1963 and 1999 and links every patent
granted after 1975 to all the patents it cites and to the CUSIP code of the assignee as
it appears in COMPUSTAT. We merge the patent records with COMPUSTAT to obtain
the winners’ and losers’ financial data before the patent was awarded.1Second, we need to
identify in the data which firms were incumbents and which firms were entrants to every
race. Since a patent must cite the prior technology it builds on, we consider the owners
of the patents for the cited technologies as incumbents to the race. Third, we need to be
sure that patents are a good measure of innovative success. Therefore, we focus on the drug
industry, where patents are crucial to reap the returns to R&D investment (see Levin et al.,
1987, and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000).2
Our model links the probability that the winner of the race is either an incumbent or an
entrant to the underlying characteristics of the race, e.g., the firms’ financial resources, the
value of the prize and the value of prior innovations. To test our predictions we fit logistic
regressions of the fraction of incumbent-won races on these variables. We find that a firm’s
probability of winning a race is increasing -on average- in its stock of cash and decreasing
in its rivals’ stocks of cash. The predicted impacts are not only statistically significant but
also economically meaningful: diﬀerences in stocks of cash imply large diﬀerences in the
probability of winning. Our results are robust to diﬀerent definitions of incumbency.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature but novel in its focus and compre-
hensiveness. The literature has devoted some attention to the commitment eﬀects of financial
structure on generic strategies in oligopolistic product market games. A capital structure
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choice that is observed by rivals can influence a firm’s aggressiveness in the product market
(see Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988, and Rotemberg and Scharfstein, 1990;
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; and Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Chevalier (1995) tests these
predictions empirically. We depart from this literature in two respects. First, we assume
that financing choices are not observable to rivals in our paper, so that the commitment
eﬀects of financing choices play no role. We believe that our assumption is appropriate to
analyze the interaction between large firms, where rivals find it diﬃcult to disentangle the
financing of individual projects from the overall financing of the concern. Second, we focus
on a diﬀerent comparative statics exercise. Instead of varying the capital structure, we vary
the financing need of firms.3
Our empirical investigation explores a game theoretic setup with a comprehensive data
base. Only few studies share these two features. Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999)
study the relationship between market share and innovation using a panel of British phar-
maceutical firms. They find that firms with more market dominance innovate more often
, consistent with Gilbert and Newbery’s “eﬃciency eﬀect”. In contrast to their study we
incorporate financing explicitly into ours and show that financing matters even if we control
for size eﬀects.
Cockburn and Henderson (1994) address whether or not R&D investments are strategic.
Gathering detailed data at the individual project level for ten of the largest firms in the phar-
maceutical industry, they find that research investments are only weakly correlated across
firms. However, as they acknowledge, their study may miss correlations between investments
of smaller potential entrants and the large firms by focusing only on the large players.4We
trade oﬀ the detail of project level data for a more comprehensive data base and show that
the winning probabilities of firms are significantly aﬀected by other firms’ characteristics.
Moreover, we include measures of the player’s financial wealth in the empirical analysis.
Lerner (1997) does find that strategic variables explain the decision of firms to innovate.
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Lerner finds that the leaders in the disk drive industry between 1971 and 1988 were less
likely to improve their disk drive density than the laggards.5Lerner’s approach owes much
of its elegance to the fact that the distance to the maximum disk drive in the industry
measures the strategic interaction appropriately. Also, he focuses on an industry where not
only the first but any firm that innovates is awarded the prize so he can treat observation
errors independently across firms. We cannot rely on such assumptions in the pharmaceutical
industry and are forced to take a more detailed view. Our approach identifies strategic
behavior from the outcome of races where the winner takes all and finds results consistent
with Lerner’s.6
Hellman and Puri (2000) also study empirically the relationship between product market
strategies and finance. They find evidence that budding firms with innovative strategies are
more likely to be funded by venture capitalists. Our results are consistent with theirs insofar
as firms with a bigger expected probability of success at innovation are financed by outsiders
at smaller costs. However, in our setup, the expected probability of success is not taken as
given but determined endogenously in a Nash Equilibrium, conditional on the technological
standing of firms, i.e., incumbent or entrant, and the availability of cash before the race.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next Section of the paper
develops the model. It derives the comparative statics on the probability that a given firm
wins the race conditional on its financial resources. Section 2 describes the data and the
construction of our proxies for incumbency and the value of innovations. Section 3 develops
the econometric model and presents the estimation results. The final section summarizes
our results.7
6
1 Theory
We consider the financing of research in a version of the Reinganum (1983) model . There
are two firms: an incumbent, I, and an entrant, E. The incumbent produces and sells the
“state-of-the-art” product. The firms can enter a research race for a higher quality product.
We model the uncertain success in this research race as the outcome of a Poisson process.
The state-of-the-art product and the innovation are protected by patents of infinite length.
The sales of the incumbent’s product yield a flow profit of π to the incumbent. If the
incumbent innovates, sales of the new (and possibly also of the old) product yield a profit
πI to him. If the entrant innovates, he obtains flow profits of πE and the incumbent obtains
flow profits πI . This formulation allows for drastic and non-drastic innovations.
If a firm enters the research race, it has to spend once and for all a fixed cost F. Once
this cost is sunk it can exert a flow of eﬀort ah for h = E, I. If a firm spends eﬀort ah its
instantaneous probability of innovation is aαh , where α < 1. The non-pecuniary cost of eﬀort
is equal to ah. Firms have limited financial resources, Wh. If Wh < F the firm needs outside
funds to finance the fixed cost.8
We assume that many investors compete in Bertrand fashion for the right to finance a
firm’s investment. They make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to firms and then firms decide whether
or not to accept the contract. A firm withWh < F that rejects its contract cannot innovate,
i.e., has probability of innovation equal to zero for all ah. After the firm has accepted a
contract, it chooses its research intensity ah. Contracts between investors and a firm are not
observable to other investors and the other firm.
We assume that contracts are not observable to third parties in order to rule out com-
mitment eﬀects of finance. That is, we adopt the simultaneous move assumption from Rein-
ganum’s paper and take Nash-Equilibrium as our equilibrium concept. We do not consider
sequential (Stackelberg) games where one firm can observe the financing of the other firm
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before it chooses its research intensity.9
We begin our analysis with the derivation of firms’ best responses. We first discuss the
entrants optimal choice of research intensity for a given research intensity of the incumbent.
Afterwards, we repeat this analysis for the incumbent. In each of these discussions we
begin with a characterization of optimal contracts. Then we characterize the firm’s research
intensity that results from accepting an optimal contract.
1.1 The Entrants’ Problem
1.1.1 The Financing of the Entrant
The Poisson nature of research implies that there are two classes of positive probability
events: either the incumbent innovates before the entrant or vice-versa. Within these classes,
events diﬀer only in the time of innovation. We consider stationary contracts where the re-
payment conditions depend on who wins the race but not on when he wins. Thus, the model
has essentially two outcomes. We place no further restrictions on the form of contracts. Con-
tracts with any arbitrarily complex time-dependent repayments (in the sense of the length
of time elapsed since the arrival of the innovation) have a simple equivalent representation
where the entrant commits to repay a constant share, s, of profits from the time of innova-
tion to infinity. Since everybody is risk-neutral, all that matters is the present value of the
repayment stream.
If the incumbent wins the race the entrant’s profits are zero. Therefore, the entrant can
repay the finance he has obtained only if he wins the race. The initial payment of F −WE
and the share of profits s completely describe all relevant information of financial contracts.
Let VE (WE, aI , s) denote the value of the entrant’s claim of future profits for given values
of wealth, the incumbent’s research, and the investor’s repayment shares. The entrant’s
problem is to accept or reject a contract oﬀered by the investor and to choose his research
eﬀort conditional on accepting. We solve this problem by backward induction. The second
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stage of the entrant’s problem can be described by the following asset equation:
rVE (WE, aI , s) = maxaE a
α
E
¡
(1− s)V +E − VE (WE, aI , s)
¢
− aαI VE (WE, aI , s)− aE, (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate and V +E ≡ πEr , i.e., the net present value of the perpetual
flow of profits, πE, starting at the time of innovation. We assume that V +E > F. In a short
interval of time between t and t + dt the entrant innovates with probability aαEdt and the
incumbent innovates with probability aαI dt. In case the entrant innovates, he receives a share
(1− s) of all future profits and thus a claim that is worth (1− s)V +E as of the time of
innovation. If either the entrant or the incumbent innovates, the entrant loses the value of
its current claim, VE (WE, aI , s) . The flow cost of research during the small interval of time
is aEdt.
The maximization problem on the right hand side of (1) is strictly concave in aE. Let
aE (s) denote a solution to this problem. The first-order condition,
α (aE (s))α−1
¡
(1− s)V +E − VE (WE, aI , s)
¢
= 1, (2)
is necessary and suﬃcient for the unique optimal choice of aE (s) induced by the contract
{F −WE, s} . We observe that the entrant’s choice of eﬀort is distorted downwards relative
to the first-best whenever s > 0. The entrant is reluctant to exert the eﬃcient amount of
eﬀort because he receives less than the social value of the innovation.
We can multiply both sides of condition (2) by aE (s) and obtain the condition
α (aE (s))α
¡
(1− s)V +E − VE (WE, aI , s)
¢
= aE (s) . (3)
If we substitute condition (3) into the asset equation (1) we can solve for the value of the
claim to the entrant
VE (WE, aI , s) = (1− s)
(1− α) (aE (s))α V +E
(1− α) (aE (s))α + aαI + r
. (4)
With perfect competition in the investors market, the equilibrium contract maximizes VE (WE, aI , s)
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subject to the constraint that the investor breaks even, i.e.,
s (aE (s))
α V +E
(aE (s))α + aαI + r
= F −WE. (5)
We let s∗ denote an optimal contract. We now give conditions for the existence of an optimal
contract.
Lemma 1 For all WE ≥ 0 and F there exists aI such that a unique optimal contract exists
if and only if aI ≤ aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
. aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
is nondecreasing in both its arguments. It is
strictly increasing in V +E whenever aI > 0. It is strictly increasing in WE whenever F > WE
and aI > 0.
The proof of Lemma 1 is somewhat lengthy and therefore relegated to the Appendix.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. The higher the research eﬀort chosen by the
incumbent, the smaller the expected value of the prize for a given eﬀort level by the entrant.
As a result, the value of the investor’s claim is decreasing in aI for fixed s, and the investor
requires a larger share of profits the higher is aI . But an increase in s decreases the entrant’s
incentive to provide eﬀort. Eventually, that is for large enough aI , these discouraging eﬀects
are so strong that an optimal contract ceases to exist. On the other hand, an increase in the
value of the race, V +E , balances these eﬀects, so that the higher is the value of the race, the
larger the critical level of the incumbent’s eﬀort aI that chokes oﬀ the entrant’s innovative
eﬀorts. Likewise, the higher is the entrant’s wealth, the smaller is the amount of money
needed from the investor and the less discouraging is an increase in the incumbent’s eﬀort.
We now investigate whether or not the entrant will accept the contract. Accepting is
optimal if and only if
VE (WE, aI , s∗)−min {F,WE} ≥ 0. (6)
where min {F,WE} = WE if and only if the entrant is financially constrained. The entrant
accepts the optimal contract if and only if the project generates a nonnegative net present
value to him, accounting for agency costs due to asymmetric information.
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Lemma 2 Suppose V +E is suﬃciently large so that the entrant engages in research for aI = 0.
Then, for all WE ≥ 0 and F, there exists aI such that the entrant accepts the optimal contract
if and only if aI ≤ aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
. aI is nondecreasing in both its arguments. aI is strictly
increasing in V +E whenever aI > 0, and strictly increasing in WE whenever both aI > 0 and
F > WE.
Proof. Substituting conditions (4) and (5) into condition (6) we obtainµ
aˆ∗αE V +E − (F −WE) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
(1− α) aˆ∗αE + aαI + r
¶
(1− α) ≥WE. (7)
where aˆ∗E is the eﬀort level induced by the optimal contract. aˆ∗E is defined by the condition
α
¡
aˆ∗αE V +E − (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r) (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r)− aˆ∗E ((1− α) aˆ∗αE + aαI + r) = 0 (8)
Using condition (8) we can simplify condition (7) and obtain
aˆ∗E
aαI + r
≥ α
1− αWE. (9)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to aαI in condition (9), we find that the left-hand side of this in-
equality is a decreasing (non-decreasing) function of aαI if and only if
daˆ∗E
daαI
< aˆ
∗
E
aαI +r
³
daˆ∗E
daαI
≥ aˆ
∗
E
aαI +r
´
.
Applying the implicit function theorem to condition (8) , we obtain
daˆ∗E
daαI
=
¡
−α (F −WE) (aαI + r) + α
¡
aˆ∗αE V +E − (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r) (F −WE)
¢
− aˆ∗E
¢
−
¡
α2aˆ∗α−1E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r)− ((1− α2) aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
¢ (10)
The denominator of this expression is negative, because aˆ∗E > aE ≡ argmaxaE (A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·))
implies that ∂∂aE (A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·))|aE=aˆ∗E < 0. (see the proof of lemma 1.) Using condi-
tion (8) (and some straightforward manipulations) to simplify expression (10) we obtain
daˆ∗E
daαI
=
aˆ∗E
aαI + r
1
α
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1−
(1− α) ((1− α) aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)µ
−α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) + (1− α) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
¶
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
| {z }
≡Γ(aˆ∗E)
(11)
Straightforward algebra shows that Γ (aˆ∗E) < 1, which implies that
daˆ∗E
daαI
< aˆ
∗
E
aαI +r
. In turn this
implies that ddaαI
³
aˆ∗E
aαI +r
´
< 0. Consequently, there is aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
uniquely defined by the
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condition
aˆ∗E (aI ; ·)
aαI + r
¯¯¯¯
aI=aI
=
α
1− αWE
such that condition (9) is satisfied if and only if aI ≤ aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
. Since aˆ
∗
E
aαI +r
is decreasing
in aαI and
daˆ∗E
dV +E
=
αaˆ∗αE (aαI + r)
−α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) + (1− α) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
> 0
(which follows again from applying the implicit function theorem to condition (8)), aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
is increasing in V +E . Finally, we observe that
daˆ∗E
dWE
aαI + r
=
α (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
−α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) + (1− α) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
> α
1− α
(By simple algebra, this condition is equivalent to 0 > −α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) , which is
obviously true). That is, an increase in WE increases the left-hand side of condition (9) by
more than it increases the right-hand side. Hence, aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
is increasing in WE.
The logic of the argument is rather simple. The value of the prize that goes to the
entrant is a strictly decreasing function of the incumbent’s level of research eﬀort. As a
result, the entrant is willing to engage in research if and only if the opponent’s eﬀort is not
too high. Conversely, for a given aI , the value of the entrant’s claim is the higher the higher
is V +E . As a result, the critical level of the incumbent’s research eﬀort that chokes oﬀ the
entrant’s research incentives is a non-decreasing function of V +E . Similarly, an increase in
wealth increases the net value of the entrant’s claim by reducing agency costs of contracting.
Moreover, this reduction of agency costs outweighs the increase in the investment cost to
the entrant. As a result, the critical level of incumbent eﬀort that chokes oﬀ the entrant’s
incentive to enter the research race is again an increasing function of WE.
We are now ready to characterize the implications of optimal contracting on the research
race.
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1.1.2 The Entrant’s Best-Response Function in the Patent Race
Let bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
denote the solution to the entrant’s problem as a function of aI if he
has wealth WE and the value of the prize is V +E , i.e., the best response function. The best
response function has the following properties:
Proposition 1 i) bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
> 0 for all aI ≤ min
©
aI , aI
ª
and bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
= 0
else;
ii)
dbE(aI ;WE ,V +E )
dWE ≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever F > WE and aI < min
©
aI , aI
ª
, other-
wise
dbE(aI ;WE ,V +E )
dWE = 0;
iii)
dbE(aI ;WE ,V +E )
dV +E
≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever aI < min
©
aI , aI
ª
.
iv) bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
is quasi-concave in aI . For WE close to F, bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
is increasing
in aI for all aI ≤ min
©
aI , aI
ª
. For WE close to zero, bE
¡
aI ;WE, V +E
¢
is single-peaked and
decreasing in aI at aI = min
©
aI , aI
ª
.
Proof. Property i) is a direct corollary to Lemmas 1 and 2. ii) follows from the implicit
function theorem applied to condition (8) ,
daˆ∗E
dWE
=
α (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r) (aαI + r)
−α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) + (1− α) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
> 0
Moreover, since both aI and aI are nondecreasing in WE, min
©
aI , aI
ª
is nondecreasing in
WE (and strictly increasing if min
©
aI , aI
ª
> 0 and F > WE.) By the same logic we prove
iii): we have
daˆ∗E
dV +E
=
αaˆ∗αE (aαI + r)
−α2 (a
α
I +r)
2
aˆ∗E
(F −WE) + (1− α) (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
> 0.
To prove iv) we begin by showing that aˆ∗E is a quasi-concave function of aαI which is either
decreasing everywhere or first increasing then decreasing. Recall from above that
daˆ∗E
daαI
=
¡
−α (F −WE) (aαI + r) + α
¡
aˆ∗αE V +E − (aˆ∗αE + aαI + r) (F −WE)
¢
− aˆ∗E
¢
−α2aˆ∗α−1E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r) + ((1− α2) aˆ∗αE + aαI + r)
≡ XY
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Diﬀerentiating once more and using d
2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 =
dX
daαI
− dYdaαI
daˆ∗E
daαI
Y , we obtain
d2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 =
1
Y
⎡
⎢⎣
−2α (F −WE) + 2
©
α2aˆ∗α−1E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
− 1
ª daˆ∗E
daαI
−
h
−α2 (α− 1) aˆ∗α−2E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r)
daˆ∗E
daαI
++(1− α2)αaˆ∗α−1E
daˆ∗E
daαI
i
daˆ∗E
daαI
⎤
⎥⎦
Except for the term {·} all the terms in this expression are strictly negative for all aˆ∗E. The
term in {·} becomes negative for aˆ∗E suﬃciently large. Consequently, d
2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 < 0 for aˆ∗E large
enough. Observe in addition, that aˆ∗E has at most one extremum. The reason is that at all
points where daˆ
∗
E
daαI
= 0 we also have d
2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 =
−2α(F−WE)
Y < 0. Consequently, aˆ∗E can have at
most one extremum, which is maximum. This implies in particular that aˆ∗E is quasi-concave
in aαI .
Using condition (11) it is easy to show that daˆ
∗
E
daαI
T 0 if and only if aˆ∗E T
¡ α
1−α (aαI + r)
2 (F −WE)
¢ 1
α+1 .
Define the convex function eeaE (aαI ) as follows
eeaE (aαI ) ≡ µ α1− α (aαI + r)2 (F −WE)
¶ 1
α+1
(12)
For V +E suﬃciently high, we have aˆ∗E (aαI )|aαI =0 > eeaE (aαI )¯¯¯aαI =0 . Since aˆ∗E (aαI ) gets concave
for aαI large and eeaE (aαI ) is convex, the two functions must eventually intersect. To the right
of the intersection, aˆ∗E (aαI ) is decreasing and eeaE (aαI ) continues to increase. Hence, aˆ∗E (aαI )
and eeaE (aαI ) cannot intersect more than once.
Finally, we prove that the best response may change its slope. Recall from the proof of
Lemma 1 that an optimal contract exists whenever aˆ∗E (aαI ) ≥ a˜E (aαI ) , where the function
a˜E (aαI ) is defined implicitly by equation (26) . Finally, from Lemma 2, an optimal contract is
accepted for aˆ∗E (aαI ) ≥ a00I (aαI ) where the function a00I is defined as a00I (aαI ) ≡ α1−αWE (aαI + r) .
It is easy to show that eeaE (aαI ) ≥ a˜E (aαI )∀aαI . If WE is close to F, then both eeaE (aαI ) and
a˜E (aαI ) take values close to zero for all aαI . As a result, the intersection of aˆ∗E (aαI ) with a00I (aαI )
is to the left of the intersections of aˆ∗E (aαI ) with eeaE (aαI ) and a˜E (aαI ) . If on the other hand,
WE is close to zero, then a00I (aαI ) takes values close to zero for all aI , and aˆ∗E (aαI ) intersects
with eeaE (aαI ) and a˜E (aαI ) before it intersects with a00I (aαI ) .
14
From Lemmas 1 and 2 it follows directly that the entrant exerts a strictly positive amount
of research eﬀort if and only if the research eﬀort chosen by the incumbent is not too large.
The higher the value of the race, i.e., the higher V +E , the higher is the entrant’s research
eﬀort. If WE ≥ F then the financing constraints are slack and an increase in WE has no
eﬀect whatsoever on the entrant’s best response. The best-response function in this case
coincides with the one in Reinganum’s model. If WE < F then the financing constraints
bind. The larger F −WE, the larger the repayment share to the investor and the smaller
the entrant’s eﬀort choice. Intuitively, an increase in F −WE increases the agency costs of
finance and increases the entrant’s marginal costs of innovative activity.
It is interesting to note that financing may change the nature of strategic interaction in
a local sense. In particular, it does so if the entrant’s wealth is close to zero. In that case,
for low levels of the incumbent’s innovative activity, an increase in the incumbent’s research
eﬀort increases the entrant’s incentive to increase his research eﬀort. That is, in that region
research eﬀorts are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer
(1985). This is the standard case which also arises in Reinganum’s model without financing
constraints. However, as the level of the incumbent’s research eﬀort is increased, the expected
value of the entrant’s claim decreases. In addition, the share of profits that must be given to
the investor to make him break even increases as the incumbent’s research eﬀort increases.
As a result, the entrant’s marginal incentives to increase his eﬀort are eventually decreased
and the nature of strategic interaction changes to strategic substitutes. This eﬀect will not
occur if the entrant needs to raise only a small amount of finance from the investor, i.e., if
WE is close to F.
1.2 The incumbent’s problem
Consider now the incumbent’s problem. Let V +I ≡ πIr denote the net present value of the
incumbent’s firm if it wins the race and let V −I ≡
πI
r ≥ 0 denote the value of the incumbent
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firm if the entrant wins the race. If V −I > 0 then the innovation is non drastic. Finally,
recall that π is the flow profit of the firm if it uses its current technology. As it is standard,
we assume that V −I ≤ πr .
1.2.1 The Financing of the Incumbent
A contract between the incumbent firm and an investor specifies the initial investment F−WI
and a repayment scheme. We again restrict attention to stationary contracts in the sense that
the repayment scheme does not depend on the date of the innovation. Any contract of this
type, whatever complex repayment structure it may have, can be written in equivalent form
in terms of repayment shares in the diﬀerent contingencies. Let these shares be (σ−, σ+, σ) ,
corresponding to the investor’s share in the profits when the entrant innovates, the incumbent
innovates, and when no one innovates, respectively. Let σ = (σ−, σ+, σ) denote the vector
of repayment shares, and let VI (aE,WI ,σ) denote the value of the incumbent’s claim to
the ongoing firm before any innovation has occurred. For brevity we shall write VI (·) for
VI (aE,WI ,σ) .
To characterize optimal contracts we proceed again in two steps. First, we characterize
the best contracts that can be oﬀered to the incumbent conditional on engaging in research.
Second, we investigate whether the incumbent will indeed find it optimal to engage in re-
search.
With financing, the asset equation takes the form
rVI (·) = maxaI a
α
I
¡¡
1− σ+
¢
V +I − VI (·)
¢
+ aαE
¡¡
1− σ−
¢
V −I − VI (·)
¢
+ (1− σ)π − aI . (13)
The diﬀerence to the entrant’s asset equation is that the incumbent receives flow profits π
as long as no innovation occurs and that the value of the incumbent’s firm if the entrant
wins the race, V −I , may be positive. Since the right-hand-side of the asset equation is strictly
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concave in aI , a solution to the incumbent’s problem must satisfy the first-order condition
αaI (σ)α−1
¡
(1− σ+)V +I − VI (·)
¢
= 1. (14)
Multiplying condition (14) on both sides by aI (σ) and substituting the resulting expression
into (13) we solve for the value of the incumbents claim
VI (aE,WI ,σ) =
(1− α) aI (σ)α (1− σ+)V +I + aαE (1− σ−)V −I + (1− σ)π
(1− α) aI (σ)α + aαE + r
. (15)
In addition, investors must break even. Formally, it must be true that
aI (σ)α σ+V +I + aαEσ−V −I + σπ
aI (σ)α + aαE + r
= F −WI . (16)
An optimal contract maximizes (15) subject to (16) and (14) . It is interesting to note that
financing does not always involve a loss of eﬃciency for the incumbent. It is sometimes
possible to implement the first-best outcome even if the incumbent needs to raise cash from
outside investors, i.e., even if WI < F.10
Lemma 3 There exists aFBE ≡ aFBE
¡
V −I ,WI , π
¢
such that a contract that implements the
first-best outcome exists if and only if aE ≤ aFBE . aFBE is strictly positive for πr > F −WI and
bounded for F −WI > V −I . F −WI ∈
¡
V −I , πr
¢
, aFBE weakly increasing in its arguments, and
strictly increasing whenever aFBE > 0.
The incumbent firm can pledge its current profits to finance its current research expen-
ditures. If the current profits are relatively large relative to the size of the investment, then
a first-best financing contract is feasible for low research eﬀorts of the entrant. The exact
condition that we derive in the appendix states that the first-best outcome is implementable
if and only if WI + a
α
EV
−
I +π
aαE+r
≥ F. a
α
EV
−
I
aαE+r
is the expected present value of the incumbent’s firm
if the entrant innovates and πaαE+r is the net present value of the incumbent’s current stream
of profits. These values are independent of the incumbent’s own eﬀort. As a result, these
values can be pledged without creating any moral hazard problems with respect to the choice
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of eﬀort. The higher the research activity of the entrant, the higher the likelihood that the
incumbent loses his current profits, and thus the smaller the value of pledgeable profits. As a
result, first-best financing becomes eventually impossible for a large enough research activity
of the entrant.
Next, we investigate whether or not the incumbent will accept the optimal contract oﬀer
that implements the first-best outcome. In view of our previous lemma, this question is
relevant when F −WI ≤ V −I , because in that case, first-best financing is feasible for all aE.
The incumbent chooses to enter the research race if and only if
VI (aE) ≥ F +
aαEV −I + π
aαE + r
. (17)
i.e., if and only if the net surplus of the project is larger than the value of profits and wealth
the incumbent obtains if he does not do any research at all.
Lemma 4 For V +I suﬃciently large there exists a
FB
E ≡ a
FB
E
¡
V +I , V −I , π
¢
such that the in-
cumbent accepts a contract that implements the first-best outcome if and only if aE ≤ a
FB
E .
aFBE is increasing in V +I and decreasing in V −I and π.
The net value of engaging in research versus not doing so depends in a quite complex way
on the entrant’s research eﬀort. However, if the race is suﬃciently valuable, the incumbent’s
participation region is convex. While it is important to understand the case of first-best
financing, the case is not very rich in terms of comparative statics. In particular, the incum-
bent’s cash plays (by definition of first-best) no role. More interesting in this respect, is the
case of a financially constrained incumbent, which we now address. The following Lemmas
are essentially identical to Lemmas 1 and 2 in the analysis of the entrant’s problem, and we
state them without further comment.
Lemma 5 For all WI ≥ 0 and F there exists aE ≡ aE
¡
V +I ,WI , V −I , π
¢
such that a unique
optimal contract exists if and only if aE ≤ aE. aE is nondecreasing in all its arguments.
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It is strictly increasing in V +I , V −I , and π whenever aE > 0. It is strictly increasing in WI
whenever F > WI and aE > 0.
Lemma 6 Suppose V +I is suﬃciently large so that the incumbent engages in research for
aE = 0. Then, for all WI ≥ 0 and F, there exists aE > 0 such that the entrant accepts the
optimal contract if and only if aE ≤ aE
¡
V +I ,WI ; ·
¢
. aI is nondecreasing in V +I and WI . aI
is strictly increasing in V +E and strictly increasing in WI whenever F > WI +
aαEV
−
I +π
aαE+r
.
1.2.2 The Incumbent’s Best-Response Function
We are now ready to state the eﬀects of financing on the incumbent’s best response function
in the patent race. These eﬀects are essentially isomorphic to those in the entrant’s case;
they diﬀer only in the feasibility conditions of first-best.
Proposition 2 i) bI
¡
aE;WI , V +I
¢
> 0 for all aE ≤ min
©
aE, aE
ª
and bI
¡
aE;WI , V +I
¢
= 0
else;
ii)
dbI(aE ;WI ,V +I )
dWI ≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever F > WI+
aαEV
−
I +π
aαE+r
and aE < min
©
aE, aE
ª
,
otherwise
dbI(aE ;WI ,V +I )
dWI = 0;
iii)
dbI(aE ;WI ,V +I )
dV +I
≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever aE < min
©
aE, aE
ª
.
iv) bI
¡
aE;WI , V +I
¢
is quasi-concave in aE. For WI close to F − a
α
EV
−
I +π
aαE+r
, bI
¡
aE;WI , V +I
¢
is increasing in aE for all aE ≤ min
©
aE, aE
ª
. For WI close to zero, bI
¡
aE;WI , V +I
¢
is
single-peaked and decreasing in aE at aE = min
©
aE, aE
ª
.
The proof is analogous to the one in the entrant’s case and therefore omitted.
1.3 Equilibrium and Comparative statics
Propositions 1 and 2 state that the R&D race is a game with strategic complements, as
defined by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) on the domain where best responses
are strictly positive when both players are not too financially constrained. It has best
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response functions that are continuous and increasing in the other firm’s research intensity
until they drop to zero, because either no optimal contract exists or the firm does not accept
its contract anymore. The best response functions are non-decreasing in own wealth, and
strictly increasing in own wealth in the case of second-best. Provided that V +I and V +E are
large relative to F, the game has an equilibrium for all WI and WE.11
We establish formally the main properties of our equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For V +I and V +E large relative to F, V −I and πr , the R&D race between the cash
constrained incumbent and the entrant has a Nash equilibrium. For WI and WE suﬃciently
close to F and α suﬃciently small and V +I and V +E suﬃciently large, the race has a unique
equilibrium, {a∗I , a∗E} .
Proof. Existence of equilibrium follows from arguments similar to Reinganum (Rein-
ganum, 1985). Therefore, we omit a formal proof here. For uniqueness, observe that best
response functions are increasing wherever they are positive forWI andWE suﬃciently close
to F. Thus, it suﬃces to have the best-responses concave. We have
d2aˆ∗E
da2I
=
d2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2α
2a2α−2I +
daˆ∗E
daαI
α (α− 1) aα−2I .
So d
2aˆ∗E
da2I
< 0 iﬀ d
2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2αaαI +
daˆ∗E
daαI
(α− 1) < 0. Clearly, that is satisfied if d
2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 < 0. When
d2aˆ∗E
(daαI )
2 ≥ 0, then d
2aˆ∗E
da2I
< 0 if
2
©
α2aˆ∗α−1E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
− 1
ª daˆ∗E
daαI
Y αa
α
I +
daˆ∗E
daαI
(α− 1) < 0,
(see the proof of proposition 1 for the definition of Y ) which is equivalent to
©
α2aˆ∗α−1E
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
− 1
ªµ
2
α
1− α
aαI
aαI + r
+ 1
¶
< (1− α
2) aˆ∗αE
aαI + r
.
For α close to zero that condition is implied by the condition for existence of a contract.
(see the proof of lemma 1.) By continuity, d
2aˆ∗E
da2I
< 0 for small α. An analogous proof applies
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to the best response function of the incumbent. Finally, a concave increasing and a convex
increasing function intersect at most once.
Proposition 4 The probability that the incumbent wins the race is increasing in WI and
decreasing in WE whenever
dbE(a∗I ;·)
daI ≤ 1 and
dbI(a∗E ;·)
daE ≤ 1.
The probability that the incumbent wins is a
∗
I
a∗I+a∗E
. An increase inWI directly increases a∗I
and also increases a∗E because the entrant’s best response function is increasing. However,
the second eﬀect is smaller when the best response functions are not too steep around the
equilibrium. In particular, the slopes of the best response functions are smaller than one
whenever the equilibrium is not too asymmetric, in the sense that a∗I and a∗E do not diﬀer
by more than a factor α. To see this, observe that dbE(aI ;·)daI = α
aˆ∗E
aI
aαI
aαI +r
Γ (aˆ∗E) , where Γ (aˆ∗E)
is defined in (11) . Since both a
α
I
aαI +r
< 1 and Γ (aˆ∗E) < 1 (see the proof of lemma 2), we have
dbE(aI ;·)
daI < 1 for all aˆ
∗
E < aIα . By the same reasoning
dbI(aE ;·)
daE for aˆ
∗
I < aEα . We illustrate these
findings in Figure 1.
The eﬀects of the remaining parameters on the equilibrium research eﬀorts are ambiguous.
Anything that causes πE to increase (say an increase in demand) will also increase πI . As a
result both reaction functions are shifted upwards by an increase in the value of the patent
race as measured by V +E and V +I and the eﬀect on the equilibrium eﬀorts is unclear. Increases
in πI and π have two eﬀects. On the one hand it may become feasible to write first-best
contracts so that the incumbent’s best response function shifts up. On the other hand, an
increase in operating profits makes the incumbent reluctant to destroy these profits, so that
he reduces his research eﬀorts and his best response function shifts downwards.12
We now proceed to investigate whether the predictions of our game are verified empirically.
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aI 
aE 
bE(aI,W'E) 
bE(aI,W''E) 
b-1I(aE,W'I) b-1I(aE,W''I) 
A 
B 
C
Slope = α 
Slope  
= α-1 
Figure 1: Inside a cone defined by the functions aE = αaI and aE = 1αaI the best response functions have
slopes smaller than one. An increase in the entrant’s wealth fromW 0E toW 00E shifts the entrant’s best response
function up. The equilibrium changes from point A to point B. Likewise, an increase in the incumbent’s
wealth from W 0I to W 00I shifts the incumbent’s best response function outwards and changes the equilibrium
from point A to C.
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2 The Data
2.1 Data set Construction
We use two sources of data. The first source is the NBER Patent Citations Data File devel-
oped by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2002), which collects information of all utility patents
granted in the United States between 1963 and 1999. We can identify the technological
category of the patents, the dates they were awarded and the assignee in the database. Each
patent awarded after 1975 is linked to all the patents it cites and the assignee names in the
patent records are matched to the name of the company as it appears in COMPUSTAT, our
second source of data. We get from COMPUSTAT the financial information of the patent
assignees whose stock is publicly traded in the U.S.
We regard each patent award in the data as the outcome of a race. This implies that
the NBER Patent Citations Data File is of use to us only for industries that rely heavily on
patent protection as a way of appropriating the returns of R&D. It is well recognized that
patenting is crucial to protect the competitive advantages of R&D in the pharmaceutical
industry (see the survey conducted by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987), and its
follow-up by Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000).13Thus, we restrict our sample to patents in
the technological category 3, i.e., Drugs and Medical, and the subcategories 31, 33 and 39:
Drugs, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous Drugs, respectively.
Then we classify patent assignees as either incumbents or entrants to a race.14We define
incumbency such that we exploit the wealth of data in the patent databases as comprehen-
sively as possible. We first find all the citations made by each pharmaceutical patent in the
NBER data base. Then we record the assignees of the cited patents and the dates at which
the cited patents were assigned. We then say that a patent was won by an incumbent if the
assignee also owned at least one of the cited patent that is not “too old”.
By “too old” we mean that some patents might not have value any more to the holder
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and thus not be relevant for his decision to develop a new product. Since it is diﬃcult to
assess when a patent has no incumbency value anymore to the potential innovator, we use
several measures of incumbency. Thus, the winner of a patent is said to be an incumbent
if he owns at least one cited patent that is at most one year old, or at most 2 years old, or
at most 3, 4, 5, 10 or 20 years old. The last is the most generous possible definition of an
incumbent, since property rights extend for 20 years at most. All of our empirical tests will
be performed for all these seven definitions of incumbency.15
We believe that the citations are a good measure of the previously existing technology
over which the citing patent is built because it is the legal obligation of the applicant to cite
all the prior art of the innovations he claims. In fact, the patent examiner, who must be a
specialist in the field, examines these citations and decides which ones to be included finally
in the award.
2.2 Data Description
The NBER data set has 121,204 patents in the subcategories 31, 33 and 39 between 1975
and 1999. We are able to classify 91,656 of these. The remaining patents are lost using our
definition of incumbency due to missing observations in the assignee names of citing or cited
patents. This problem is particularly acute for the older patents.
Table 1 summarizes the results of applying our definition of incumbency. Under the most
generous definition of incumbency, a patent is won by an entrant if the assignee owns none
of the citations or if the citations it owns are older than 20 years. In that case, 65.11% of
all classifiable patents between 1975 and 1999 were awarded to entrants. A more restrictive
definition of an incumbent, e.g., the youngest citation is older than 5 years, implies a larger
percentage of patents won by entrants: 73.81%. Not surprisingly, the percentage of entrant-
won patents decreases in time. To a large extent this is due to the fact that we expect to have
lost proportionally more incumbent won patents in the earlier years: entrant won patents
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with few young citations can always be classified. Moreover, even using the most generous
definition of incumbency, almost two thirds of the patents are won by entrants.16
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 A Logit Approach
Let λ∗ih = (a∗ih)α denote the equilibrium hazard rate of firm h ∈ {E, I} in race i. The Nash
Equilibrium of our model can be written as
λ∗iI = λ∗I(WiI ,WiE, V +iE, V +iI , πi, SiI , SiE) = λ∗I(XiI ,XiE;βI) = λ∗I(Xi;βI),
λ∗iE = λ∗E(WiI ,WiE, V +iE, V +iI , πi, SiI , SiE) = λ∗E(XiI ,XiE;βE) = λ∗E(Xi;βE),
where WiI and WiE are measures of financial wealth, V +E and V +I measure the values of
the new patent to the winner, πi measures the value of the patent that is replaced, and
SiI and SiE are vectors of other variables we us as empirical controls. βI and βE are
the parameter vectors associated to the exogenous variables. The incumbent’s equilibrium
winning probability is
Pr(race i is won by the incumbent) =
Z ∞
0
e−(λ∗iI+λ∗iE)tλ∗iIdt =
λ∗iI(Xi)
λ∗iI(Xi) + λ∗iE(Xi)
=
λ∗I (Xi)
λ∗E(Xi)
λ∗I (Xi)
λ∗E(Xi)
+ 1
If we approximate the hazard rates with exponential functions of a linear index of the para-
meters, i.e. if we take λih ≈ exp(Xiβh), then we we can write
λ∗iI
λ∗iE
≈ exp(XiβI −XiβE) =
exp(Xi(βI − βE)) ≡ exp(Xiβ). Notice that the hazard rate ratio depends only on the dif-
ference βI − βE and not on each parameter individually. Henceforth we write β for this
diﬀerence. The incumbent’s equilibrium winning probability simplifies to
Pr(race i won by the incumbent) = exp(Xiβ)
1 + exp(Xiβ)
(18)
Since the expression on the right hand side of condition (18) is nothing but the well-known
logit formula, this suggest that we might want to interpret our model in the sense that
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firms “submit” their exogenous variables at the beginning of the race and “nature” picks the
incumbent with probability
Pr(Ii = 1) = Pr(β0 + β1WI + β2WE + cα+ εi ≥ 0), (19)
where Ii = 1 if the winner of patent i is an incumbent, and 0 otherwise. WI andWE are mea-
sures of the incumbent’s and entrant’s financial resources, respectively, the vector c includes
the control variables V +iE, V +iI , πi, SiI , SiE, and α is the vector of their associated parameters.
The error term, εi, represents the randomness in the choice of nature. If we assume that the
error term follows the Weibull, conditions (19) and (18) become equivalent.17Hence, we can
test our model with a logit regression.
The comparative statics of our model regarding the eﬀect of financial constraints to the
racing behavior are that β1 should be significantly diﬀerent from zero and positive, while
β2 should be significantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. The strength of this test is that
both variables determine the outcome of the race jointly and this is precisely how this is
implemented empirically. We also test the role of strategic interactions of this game through
the regressors included in c. Observe, as we noted earlier, that our estimation identifies the
vector of parameters β (but not βI and βE) from the variation in the observed outcome of
the races.
3.2 Specification
3.2.1 Cash: WE and WI .
We use the level of cash holdings (COMPUSTAT item 36) by the firm as our measure for
financial wealth, W . The amount held as cash is precisely what the firm can use to finance
R&D without requiring external finance, which is more costly. However, a firm may not
pledge the whole stock of cash to one race if it engages in many races simultaneously. Since
we cannot observe the number of races that the firm was engaged in at a certain point
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in time, we use the value of total assets as a proxy, assuming that the two measures are
positively correlated. Then, we normalize the value of cash holdings by the amount of total
assets to proxy for the amount of cash that a firm has per race. Since firms choose how
much to spend in the race based on their availability of cash before the race is won we use
three diﬀerent lags of W : one, two and three years before the patent is awarded.
The estimation of the parameters in (19) poses one major challenge: while we can observe
directly in COMPUSTAT WE when an entrant wins and WI when an incumbent wins,
we have to find reasonable proxies for WE when an incumbent wins the race and for WI
when an entrant wins. We assume that, when an incumbent wins a patent, any firm in the
industry that had no cited patents is a potential entrant. WE is proxied by the average of
the normalized value of cash holdings in the given time period over all the firms without
cited patents in the same four-digit Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC).
In case of WI the problem could in principle be solved in the same way as for WE.When
a patent is won by an entrant, the financial wealth of incumbents could be proxied by the
average ofW over all firms with cited patents. Unfortunately, this solution proves unfruitful
ex post. We find very fewmatches when we merge the CUSIP codes of the assignees of patents
cited by entrant-won patents in the NBER Patents Citations Database with COMPUSTAT.
In fact, in regressions that we do not report here, almost all the observations on entrant-
won patents were lost due to the unobservability of WI : less than 2% of the usable sample
corresponded to patents won by entrants. The estimates from such regressions are clearly
not to be trusted, since the percentage of entrant-won patents in the population exceeds
65%.
To overcome this problem we proxy the incumbent’s financial wealth with a measure that
would bias the results against our maintained hypothesis. Our hypothesis is that β1 should
be significantly diﬀerent from zero and positive. If the downward-biased estimate is still
significantly diﬀerent from zero and positive then so should also be an unbiased estimate.
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One way to bias the estimate downward is to proxy WI for entrant-won races with the
maximum value of cash holdings to total assets in the same SIC code for the given time
period. In other words, we use the highest cash to assets ratio, i.e., the firm richest in cash
per race, in the industry to proxy for the incumbent’s financial wealth when entrants win.
Intuitively, this would bias downward the maximum-likelihood estimator of β1 because it
would associate a failure to win the race by an incumbent with levels of financial resources
that are, by definition, higher than those of any of the actual incumbents.18
3.2.2 The market value of the award: V +E and V
+
I .
Our model does not give an unambiguous prediction of the eﬀects of V +E and V +I . However,
the outcome of the race clearly depends on these measures and it is necessary to include them
as control variables in all our empirical specifications. Measures of the value of a patent are
not easy to come by. For example, the value of intangibles is not disaggregated to the patent
level in COMPUSTAT. However, Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2004) have shown recently
that the market value of a patent can be well approximated by the number of citations it
patent receives. While it has been used traditionally as a measure of the social value of a
patent (e.g., Trajtenberg 1990), the number of citations has been used by Hall et al. (2004)
to show that an extra citation per patent boosts the firm’s market value by 3% on average.
Thus, we use the number of citations that a patent received in its whole lifetime to measure
V +E and V +I . Even if we cannot tell how each player profits diﬀerently from a given patent,
the number of citations is a good proxy for both V +E and V +I because increases in the number
of citations are indicative of increases in either. Note too that the strategic behavior in the
race depends on the ex ante expectations of these values not on their realizations. Thus,
what we use is really a proxy.
Table 2 summarizes this measure. Panel A shows the average number of citations received
by patents won by entrants and incumbents for seven definitions of incumbency. Incumbent-
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won patents appear to receive on average more citations, i.e., are more valuable. This may
be because, all other things constant, incumbents need stronger incentives than entrants to
innovate due to the cannibalization eﬀect. Panel B tests if the diﬀerence of the means is
significantly diﬀerent from zero. When incumbency is defined as owning at least one cited
patent that is not older than 5 years, we can reject strongly that patents won by entrants
are, on average, more valuable than patents won by incumbents. However, this measure may
be inaccurate because of diﬀerences across time in the propensity of applicants and reviewers
to include citations, and by the natural truncation in the count of citations made by the
more recent patents. Thus, we rescale the numbers of citations by the average number of
citations received by a patent in each grant year and technological category (these factors
are provided by Hall, et al., 2002). As shown in Panel C, for all definitions of incumbency,
we reject strongly that patents won by entrants are more valuable.
3.2.3 The market value of cited patents: π.
Our measure for π is the average number of citations received by the cited patents. We
distinguish between cited patents that are less than one year old, between 1 and 2 years old,
2 and 3, and so forth, up to between 10 and 20 year-old citations. In all cases, we rescale
these counts by the average number of citations received in the technological group in the
particular grant year. As discussed above, the theoretical eﬀect of π is ambiguous. Thus,
the net eﬀect of π on the probability that the incumbent wins is an empirical issue.
3.2.4 Patenting Experience and Firm Size
We include the average number of patents accumulated by the incumbents and the entrants to
the date of the award of the patent, in the same patent class, to control for the eﬀectiveness
of the player’s obtaining patents. We would expect that players who have accumulated
more patents in the past in the same class would be more experienced in the patenting
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process and thus be more likely to obtain a new patent, ceteris paribus. We control also
for the average size of the incumbents and entrants. We expect the size to capture other
unobservable variables, and that larger firms would be more likely to win given races all
other things constant. For example, size might capture some variation in the eﬀectiveness of
R&D, that is not accounted for by the previous patenting experience of the firm. We use in
all regressions year dummies as further controls. These should capture exogenous aggregate
changes in financing conditions or additional changes in procedures in the US Patent Oﬃce.
3.2.5 The Error term
Finally, since we work with a large cross-section of patents, the error term, ε, could be
heteroskedastic. For every specification we compute the maximum likelihood estimates of
the logit under the assumption that the error is homoskedastic. We use these estimates to
perform the BRMR specification test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon ( 2004), where
the alternative hypothesis is that V ar(εi) = exp(Ziθ). In Zi we include all the exogenous
characteristics that describe the race i : the citations received by the patent and the average
number of citations received by all the patents cited by patent i.19
3.3 Results
We estimate the parameters of (19) when we use one, two or three year lags of the value
of cash holdings normalized by total assets. Table 4 shows these estimates when consider
balance sheet data two years before the award of the patent. Tables ii and iii in the Web
Supplement show the estimates for one and three year lags. Each column in these tables is
for one of the definitions of an incumbent.20
20 In all cases we also computed probit estimates. The results are not reported here but are extremely similar. The statistical
inference from probit estimates is not diﬀerent than from logit.
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3.3.1 Base Specification
The results shown in the first column of Table 4 are very consistent with the predictions of
the model. In this case we use the most generous definition of an incumbent, which is when
patents that are up to twenty years old still make the firm an incumbent to the race.
Cash: The estimates of β1 and β2 are highly statistically significant and have the sign
predicted by our model: the incumbent’s cash to total assets ratio parameter has a positive
sign and the entrant’s cash to total assets ratio parameter has a negative sign. We interpret
the value and discuss the economic significance of these estimates and most others in Section
3.3.3 below.
Size: The size of incumbents, measured by the total book value of assets one year before
the race has a positive sign, whereas the size of entrants has a negative sign. Both estimates
are significantly diﬀerent from zero. All other things constant, larger entrants or incumbents
are more likely to win than smaller ones.21
Number of Patents: As expected, the more patents the incumbent has accumulated,
the more likely it is that he wins the race (a positive and significant estimate). The same
is true for entrants but the coeﬃcient of the entrant’s accumulated patents is much larger
than that of the incumbent.
Value of Race: The estimate of the parameter associated to the market value of the
patent raced for, as proxied by the number of citations it receives is positive and significantly
diﬀerent from zero in the first column. A higher expected value of the patent shifts right
both best-response functions, so ex-ante the magnitude of this eﬀect cannot be assessed
(ultimately, it depends on the slope of both reaction functions, which cannot be identified
with this data).
Age of Cited Patents: Table 4 shows also the role of old cited patents on the incum-
21We have also used the value of total plant and equipment as a size control. The results are virtually unchanged, and thus
not reported here.
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bent’s incentives to innovate. In the case of cited patents that are between 3 and 20 years
old, the higher π the smaller the probability that the winner is an incumbent. All of the
associated coeﬃcients are negative and significantly diﬀerent from zero, to the 0.01 level.
However, the cited patents that are less than two years old increase the probability that the
winner is an incumbent the more valuable they are. Thus, incumbents with recent patents
of high value are able to patent more within the next two years of these awards. This may
happen because subsequent related innovations follow more easily from a race won recently
by the same firm. The more valuable the patent, the more incentives the incumbent will
have to obtain similar patents soon. After two years this eﬀect seems to disappear and the
value of cited patents operates through the replacement eﬀect of innovation.
Further tests: The number of usable observations is significantly smaller than the total
sample size. After the merge with COMPUSTAT, only 5,143 patents of 91,656 are usable, at
most. This is inevitable, and to a large extent expected since a large number of patents are
awarded to universities, or privately traded firms. However, the proportion of entrant-won
races in the sample used for estimation is not too much diﬀerent from the same proportion
over the whole sample. Finally, note that homoskedasticity cannot be rejected.
Definition of Incumbent: It is interesting to compare the estimates across columns in
Table 4. From left to right, we report the estimates for narrower definitions of incumbency.
If incumbency is defined as the winner also having cited patents that are up to 5, or 10
years old then we have a fit of the model that is very consistent with the theory and with
the results of the first column. The estimates for β1 and β2 are robust to narrowing down
the definition of incumbency to 10, 5 or even 4 years. As predicted by the model, the richer
in cash is the incumbent (entrant), the more likely it is that the incumbent (entrant) wins
the race, in all cases. The estimates decrease in absolute value. This is clear for β1 because
for broader definitions of incumbency we have to approximate the losing incumbent’s cash
resources with those of the cash-richest firm in its industry in fewer cases. The estimate of
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β2 is strongest also when we account for the eﬀect of 10 year-old or 20 year-old citations,
predicting a more powerful eﬀect of cash balances on the chances of winning the race.
In the second and third columns the estimated eﬀect of total assets value in the probability
of winning is similar to the first column. As before, more experience in patenting makes either
type significantly more likely to win.
As we narrow further the incumbency definition to 2 years the estimate for the incumbents
assets suggests that smaller incumbents are more likely to win ceteris paribus. This estimate
may be a result of the downward bias that we impose on our tests or also that the correct
definition of incumbency is between 4 and 20 years. Also, the estimated eﬀect of patenting
experiences by the entrant weakens for narrower definitions.
Note that in the last two columns we can only include as controls the average number of
citations of patents cited that are at most three or two years old. This may explain why the
eﬀect of cash is smaller in these columns too, although the estimates remain consistent with
the theory.
3.3.2 Other lags for cash holdings
When we use one-year or three-year rather than one-year lags for the measures of financial
wealth and the size of the firm the estimates tell a story that is, at least qualitatively, similar
to the previous case. With three year lags the fit that is most consistent with the theory
occurs with the 5, 10 or 20-year-old definitions of incumbency. Cash constraints have the
eﬀect predicted by our theory: a cash-richer incumbent or entrant is more likely to win. The
magnitude of the cash coeﬃcients is very similar with three-year lags, and smaller in absolute
value when using one year lags. With three year lags the coeﬃcients of accumulated patents
by entrants or incumbent are still close to each other, and the eﬀect of changes in the value
of cited patents is as larger than before.
With one year lags we can use more observations and we can to match the patent data
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with COMPUSTAT for proportionally more entrant won patents. Thus, the downward bias
on the coeﬃcients associated to the incumbent’s variables (cash to assets ratio or total assets
value) is larger. However, we note that the Pseudo R-Squared coeﬃcients are smallest for this
case. In fact, the last two columns show that more experience by the entrants is associated
on average with a smaller probability of winning. Tables ii and iii in the Web Supplement
show the results.
We conclude from this analysis that the data suggests that the empirical model is correctly
specified when we use a definition of incumbency between 5 and 20 years, and in those
cases the results are as predicted by the theory. The results are generally robust, but most
consistent with the theory when we use two or three year lags for the balance sheet data.
3.3.3 Discussion of Economic Significance
We have shown above that the cash availability of an incumbent or an entrant up to three
years before a patent is awarded has a statistically significant eﬀect on the outcome of the
race. To see whether or not this eﬀect is also economically significant we compute the
average change in the probability that the incumbent wins with respect to a change in the
value of cash available by US$1 million when all other variables take their median value
and remain constant, using the coeﬃcients for the benchmark specifications (Table 4 below,
and Table iii in the Web Supplement). The results are reported in Table 5. We see that
the increase (decrease) in the probability that the entrant (incumbent) wins the race is on
average between 0.00128 and 0.00214. To have a better sense of this estimate in the sample
of firms used here we compute the diﬀerence between the predicted probabilities that the
winner is an incumbent in a race where the entrant firm is in the 9th and in the 1st deciles
of the sample distribution of cash divided by assets. We call this diﬀerence ∆P1→9. We find
that cash has an economically significant eﬀect: ceteris paribus, an entrant firm in the 9th
decile of the cash to assets distribution is more likely to win the race than one in the 1st
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decile by a diﬀerence in probability between 0.29 and almost 0.4.
The marginal eﬀect for incumbents’ wealth is smaller, and this is not surprising because
of the downward bias on β1 and the possibility that first-best contracting is feasible for the
incumbent for some races. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence in the predicted probabilities of an
incumbent winner at the 9th and 1st deciles of cash is significant, i.e., ∆P1→9 is between
0.45 and 0.54.
Table 5 shows too that each accumulated patent matters much more to entrants than
to incumbents. Having an additional patent increases on average the probability that the
incumbent wins by 0.002, whereas it increases the probability that the entrant wins by at
least 0.021. Since incumbents on average have about twice more patents than entrants in
this sample, this result may be indicative of diminishing returns in patenting experience. In
this table we see too that the largest eﬀect of the won citations on the probability that an
incumbent wins is by those that are at most one year old.
3.3.4 Further Specifications
So far, our proxy for the player’s cash per race for a patent has been the amount of cash
(lagged one, two or three years) divided by the total value of assets. Thus, we have assumed
that the size of the firm, i.e., assets, approximates well the number of races that the firm
chooses to be in. To test the appropriateness of this proxy we augment the specification to
allow for the interaction between cash divided by assets and the number of citations received
by the patent. If a firm engages simultaneously in diﬀerent races any additional cash made
available would be spent in the most profitable races so as to equate the marginal profit in
every race. Thus, the firm would try to be less cash constrained in more profitable races
and there, the probability of success should be less sensitive to cash. Given that the number
of citations received is itself a measure of the value of a patent, π, then if we estimate the
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model
Pr(Ii = 1) = Pr(β0 + β1WI + β2WE + β3π ∗WI + β4π ∗WE + cα+ εi ≥ 0), (20)
we would expect β3 to be negative and β4 to be positive. Table 6 shows the estimates of the
parameters in (20). For parsimony, we report here only the estimates using cash and assets
lagged two or three years and for the three broadest definitions of incumbency (20, 10 or 5
years). These cases showed the best fit for the benchmark estimation.
When cash and assets are lagged two years (first three columns) the estimates are similar
with respect to the specification without the interactions. The estimates for β1, β2, β3, and
β4 have the expected sign in all the columns. The estimate for β4 is not significant at the
95% level for the 20-year definition of incumbency but all others are at the 99% level. Note
that by augmenting the specification to allow for interactions, the estimated direct eﬀect of
cash appears seems to be bigger as the absolute values of bβ1 and bβ2 have increased. In the
next section we interpret these values in terms of their eﬀect in the probabilities of winning
the race.
All the estimates associated to patent counts are all smaller, in absolute values. The
average number of patents accumulated by entrants is still statistically diﬀerent from zero
and it increases on average the probability that an entrant wins. However, the value of
the coeﬃcient is much smaller. The last three columns show the estimates using the three-
year lags for the balance sheet variables and show basically similar results as the previous
specification, but with smaller estimates for the patent counts.
We argued previously that the total cash balance might not capture well the role of cash
availability in a patent race when players are financially constrained because each firm might
be racing simultaneously for many patents. All of our results above show that the model’s
predictions are consistent with the data when we divide cash by assets. In the Appendix we
report the estimates of the parameters in (20), but in this case cash is not divided by total
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assets (see Table iv, Web Supplement). As we expected, several estimates are no longer
consistent with the theoretical predictions. The total number of patents accumulated by
entrants have now a positive eﬀect on the probability that the incumbent wins and the
incumbent’s size has a negative eﬀect. The signs of the estimates of β2 and β4 are the
opposite too.
Panel B shows the marginal eﬀects and ∆P1→9 for the model with interactions between
cash and π. Here the eﬀect of cash is economically significant too, as ∆P1→9 is between 0.46
and 0.62 for the entrant, and between 0.4 and 0.6 for the incumbent.
3.4 Further Robustness Checks
We argued above that changes in the player’s cash availability have unambiguous eﬀects
on the equilibrium probabilities of winning the race, and thus are testable, when the value
of the race is high enough. It remains to be checked that the data set we use includes
mostly races that satisfy these conditions. It is not possible to tell ex-ante what are the
values of the boundaries after which the game is one of strategic complementarity. To see if
there is a reason for concern, we estimated our model with the patents in the sample that
received more citations than the median. The results with the upper half of the sample are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar than for the whole sample. We omit these results
here for parsimony.22
We estimated our model too defining incumbency with patents up to 25 or 30 years old.
In these cases, the fit was very poor. We take this as positive news because patents expire
after 20 years. Thus, there is little room for concern that our incumbency index is capturing
something else.
We chose to define the entrant as an average firm in the same industrial segment (4 digit
SIC code) as the incumbent in cases when the winner of the race was the incumbent. As an
22These results are available upon request.
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alternative we defined an entrant as any firm that had also patented in the same subclasses
as the patent raced for but with no citations by it. Under this definition, any firm that
has patented in the same subclass in the past, but is not necessarily in the same industry,
is assumed to have raced for any new patents in that subclass. This approach resulted
unfeasible: for most patents, the set of firms that had obtained patents in the same subclass
that were not cited was either small or often empty. Moreover, very few of these could be
matched with COMPUSTAT to obtain their financial information.
Table v of the Supplement compares the observed entrant firms (the winners) with the
firms without cited patents in the same industry (the assumed losers). Winning entrants
are about five times larger than losers in terms of assets (Panel A) but only twice as much
of cash, on average (Panel B). Losing entrants do have some patenting experience though.
While they have about six times less patents than winning entrants, they have on average
accumulated over 18 patents in the subcategories 31, 33 and 39 by the time of the award.
Thus, we believe that the firms we have picked to represent entrant are not foreign to any
race for a patent within their industry segment.
4 Conclusions
This paper provides a way to understand the role of financing constraints in innovation. It
incorporates the contracting problem into a race between an incumbent and an entrant. Our
theoretical model shows that wealthier firms are more likely to innovate and our empirical
findings support this claim.
We study sequences of races but not the evolution of particular firms within the industry.
An interesting question for future research is how the financing constraints of firms evolve
over time as they accumulate patents and how this aﬀects the dynamics of industry structure.
We pursue these questions in ongoing research.
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Figure Legend
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the best-response behavior of the competing firms and
the comparative statics of the equilibrium in the patent race. Inside a cone defined by the
functions aE = αaI and aE = 1αaI the best response functions have slopes smaller than
one. An increase in the entrant’s wealth from W 0E to W 00E shifts the entrant’s best response
function up. The equilibrium changes from point A to point B. Likewise, an increase in the
incumbent’s wealth from W 0I to W 00I shifts the incumbent’s best response function outwards
and changes the equilibrium from point A to C.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. An optimal contract is the solution to the problem
max
s
VE (WE, aI , s) (21)
s.t. s (aE (s))
α V +E
(aE (s))α + aαI + r
= F −WE
where aE (s) is defined by (2) . It is easy to show that dVE(WE ,aI ,s)ds < 0 for all s. Thus,
the solution, when it exists, is the smallest s that satisfies equations (5) and (3) . It is
convenient to represent the solution by the research eﬀort induced by the contract. Let
aˆE ≡ aˆE
¡
aI , F,WE, V +E
¢
denote an eﬀort level induced by an incentive compatible contract
where the investor breaks even and let aˆ∗E denote the eﬀort level induced by the optimal,
incentive compatible break-even contract. Combining (5) and (3) we observe that aˆE satisfies
the condition
α
¡
aˆαEV +E − (aˆαE + aαI + r) (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r)| {z }
:=A(aE ,aI ,F,WE ,V +E )|aE=aˆE
= aˆE ((1− α) aˆαE + aαI + r)| {z }
:=B(aE ,aI)|aE=aˆE
. (22)
By straightforward algebra and calculus, the functions A (aE; ·) and B (aE; ·) as defined
in condition (22) have the following properties.23Whenever V +E − F ≥ 0 and WE ≥ 0,
with at least one strict inequality, then A (aE; ·) is increasing concave in aE and satisfies
A (aE; ·)|aE=0 ≤ 0 and limaE→∞A (aE; ·) =∞. A
¡
aE, aI , F,WE, V +E
¢
is increasing in V +E and
decreasing in F −WE for all aE and aI . B (aE; ·) is increasing convex in aE and satisfies
B (aE, ·)|aE=0 = 0 and limaE→∞B (aE, ·) =∞. Thus, the function
A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·) = α
¡
aαEV +E − (aαE + aαI + r) (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r)−aE ((1− α) aαE + aαI + r)
(23)
is strictly concave in aE.An optimal contract exists if and only ifmaxaE (A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·)) ≥
0. Let aE ≡ argmaxaE (A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·)) . Clearly, aE exists and is unique. By straight-
forward calculus we find that aE satisfies the first-order condition
α2
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
(aαI + r) =
¡
1− α2
¢
aE + a1−αE (aαI + r) (24)
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Substituting (24) into (23) we find
A (aE; ·)−B (aE; ·) = 1− αα aE (a
α
E + aαI + r)− α (aαI + r)
2 (F −WE)
Thus, an optimal contract exists if and only if
a1+αE + aE (aαI + r) ≥
α2
1− α (a
α
I + r)
2 (F −WE) (25)
Define a˜E (uniquely) by condition (25), stated as an equality
α2
1− α (a
α
I + r) (F −WE) =
1
aαI + r
a˜1+αE + a˜E (26)
To prove our lemma, we show that i) aE (aαI ; ·) is an increasing and concave function of aαI ;
ii) a˜E (aαI ; ·) is an increasing and convex function of aαI ; and iii) if a˜E (0; ·) > aE (0; ·) then
the slope of a˜E (aαI ; ·) with respect to aαI is for all aI larger than the slope of aE (aαI ; ·) , which
implies that a˜E (aαI ; ·) > aE (aαI ; ·) for all aαI .
i) aE (aαI ; ·) is increasing and concave: Applying the implicit function theorem to condition
(24) , and using condition (24) to simplify we obtain
daE
daαI
=
α2
¡
V +E − (F −WE)
¢
− a1−αE
(1− α2) + (1− α) a−αE (aαI + r)
=
aE
(aαI + r)
(1− α2)
(1− α2) + (1− α) a
α
I +r
aαE
> 0.
Diﬀerentiating another time we find that
d2aE
daα2I
=
daE
daαI
(aαI + r)− aE
(aαI + r)
2
(1− α2)
(1− α2) + (1− α) a
α
I +r
aαE
− aEaαI + r
(1− α2) (1− α)
aαE−αa
α−1
E
daE
daαI
(aαI +r)
(aαE)
2³
(1− α2) + (1− α) a
α
I +r
aαE
´2
Since (
1−α2)
(1−α2)+(1−α)
aαI +r
aαE
< 1, we have daEdaαI <
aE
aαI +r
, which implies that d2aEdaα2I < 0.
ii) a˜E (aαI ; ·) is increasing and convex: Proceeding analogously we note that
da˜E
daαI
=
α2
1−α2 (aαI + r) (F −WE)− a˜E
(1 + α) a˜αE + (aαI + r)
=
a˜E
aαI + r
µ
1 +
(1− α) a˜αE
(1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r
¶
> 0
41
and
d2a˜E
daα2I
=
da˜E
daαI
(aαI + r)− a˜E
(aαI + r)
2
µ
1 +
(1− α) a˜αE
(1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r
¶
+
a˜E
aαI + r
α (1− α) a˜α−1E (aαI + r)− (1− α) a˜αE
((1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r)
2
Since 1 + (1−α)a˜
α
E
(1+α)a˜αE+aαI +r
> 1 we observe that da˜EdaαI >
a˜E
aαI +r
. Moreover,
da˜E
daαI
(aαI + r)− a˜E
(aαI + r)
2 −
a˜E
aαI + r
(1− α) a˜αE
((1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r)
2
= a˜E
(1− α) a˜αE
((1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r) (aαI + r)
2 − a˜E
(1− α) a˜αE
(aαI + r) ((1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r)
2 > 0
As a result, we can state d
2a˜E
daα2I
> 0.
iii) if a˜E (0; ·) > aE (0; ·) then a˜E (aαI ; ·) > aE (aαI ; ·) for all aI : Comparing the slopes of
the functions we find that a˜E > aE implies that
da˜E
daαI
=
a˜E
aαI + r
µ
1 +
(1− α) a˜αE
(1 + α) a˜αE + aαI + r
¶
> aE
(aαI + r)
(1− α2)
(1− α2) + (1− α) a
α
I +r
aαE
=
daE
daαI
Therefore, the functions intersect if and only if a˜E (0; ·) ≤ aE (0; ·) .
From i) through iii), it follows that there is a unique aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
such that an optimal
contract exists for all aI ≤ aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
. aI is nondecreasing in V +E and strictly increasing in
V +E whenever aI > 0. This follows from applying the implicit function theorem to condition
(24) , which shows that
daE
dV +E
=
α2 (aαI + r)
(1− α2) + (1− α) a−αE (aαI + r)
> 0,
and observing on the other hand that a˜E is independent of V +E . Finally, aI
¡
V +E ,WE
¢
is
nondecreasing in WE and strictly increasing if aI > 0 and F > WE. Applying the same logic
as before we find
daE
dWE
=
α2 (aαI + r)³
(1− α2) + (1− α) a
α
I +r
aαE
´ > − α21−α (aαI + r)1+α
aαI +r
a˜αE + 1
=
da˜E
dWE
for all aI which proves the result.
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Footnotes
1. Our focus on COMPUSTAT makes us restrict attention only to publicly traded firms. Usually these
firms are relatively wealthy, so financing constraints should bind less for them. Thus, if we find that the
predictions of our model are verified for a set of less cash-constrained firms like those in COMPUSTAT,
they should also be satisfied in the set of smaller, private firms.
2. It is widely acknowledged that firms in many other industries use other mechanisms to protect the
competitive advantages of R&D (e.g., superior marketing, customer service, client switching costs) and
in such industries patent records do not represent well their innovations and the races for them. We
have limited ourselves to the study of patents in the pharmaceutical industry because we rely on patent
data to measure success in a race. However, our method can be applied in a straight forward way to
the study of any race in any industry provided that a satisfactory measure of success is available.
3. For a recent model of debt as a strategic choice, see Jensen and Showalter (2004). In contrast to their
approach, which takes the form of the contracts as given, we work from first principles, i.e., we derive
the equilibrium financing contracts for competitors given their financing gap.
4. The authors mention that the firms they sample account for approximately 25 to 30% of the worldwide
sales and R&D of the Ethical Drugs Industry and claim that these firms are not markedly unrepresen-
tative of the industry in terms of size, or of technical and commercial performance.
5. Note that this result is diametrically opposed to the results of Blundell, et al. (1999): technology
laggards have more incentives to innovate because, unlike leaders, their innovative eﬀorts do not can-
nibalize profits from “shelving” current innovations.
6. Another advantage of our approach is that we do not have to control for technological opportunity.
Since we focus on races that have actually occurred and been won by someone, our observations are
conditional on there being a technological opportunity to explore.
7. To avoid duplication in the paper, some proofs and tables have been relegated to an attached supple-
mentary appendix.
8. We could allow for a technology where the hazard rate is f(ah, kh), where kh is a variable investment
complementary to eﬀort. However, this introduces further technical complications without adding
insights.
9. Our main results are not aﬀected by this modeling choice.
10. The proofs of our results in this section follow the same logic as those for the entrant’s problem. To
avoid repetition, we have relegated these proofs to an attached supplementary appendix.
11. While the case of very financially constrained players is interesting from a theoretical perspective, it
does not seem to be relevant for our empirical analysis. Our empirical investigation below uses firms
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that are in COMPUSTAT, i.e., publicly traded. These firms’ assets should be reasonably large relative
to the fixed cost of an R&D race.
12. It should be stressed that our main result, i.e., the comparative statics of equilibrium probabilities with
respect to wealth, does not depend on investments being strategic substitutes or complements. These
results are available on request.
13. Firms in many other industries use rather superior marketing, customer service or improved product
characteristics instead of patents.
14. In our model, an incumbent is the player that is currently profiting from the existing technology,
while an entrant is not. It is diﬃcult to construct an equivalent empirical measure, unless a data set
is constructed specifically for this purpose. Lerner (1997), for example, collects a data base of disk
drive manufacturers, from the industry’s annual reports. Hence he is able to observe the disk drive
characteristics that each firms sells, and when innovators market higher disk drive densities. As far as
we know, this is the only study that takes a step towards defining incumbency at the firm level.
15. We have also repeated our empirical tests for the cases where incumbency is defined as having cited
your own patents that are up to 25 or 30 years old. Due to patent law, we should not expect 25 or
30 year old patents to have any incumbency value. However, we believe that repeating the exercise
through these other definitions of incumbency can make more clear that incumbency matters and our
empirical approach to define is relevant. We will comment these results later in the paper.
16. While preliminary, this observation is consistent with the predictions of Reinganum (1983) and the
results of Lerner (1997): all other things constant, the incumbent will have less incentives than the
entrant to invest more heavily in research and develop the next innovation.
17. It should be noted that the equivalence holds only for the Weibull. Some authors prefer to use the nor-
mal distribution for the error term, but this would not link directly the probabilities in the theoretical
model to those in the econometric model. We compute but do not report here parameter estimates
using the normality assumption. As it often happens, the estimates we obtained in both cases are
extremely similar, most likely being diﬀerent only because of the diﬀerence in the variances that scale
the parameters under each distributional assumption (see, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon,
2004, Chapter 11).
18. We have illustrated the downward bias on the maximum likelihood estimates in a previous version,
which is available upon request.
19. This test is performed by fitting the model
bV − 12i (Ii − exp(Xibβ)
exp(Xibβ) + 1) = bV −
1
2
i
exp(Xibβ)
(exp(Xibβ) + 1)2Xib+bV −
1
2
i
exp(Xibβ)
(exp(Xibβ) + 1)2 (−Xibβ)Zic+u,
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where bV − 12i and bβ are the maximum likelihood estimates of the error variance and slope parameters,
respectively, of the homoskedastic logit model, i.e., θ = 0. Under the null hypothesis, the explained
sum of squares of this regression is asymptotically distributed as χ2(r), where r is the dimension of Z.
20. In all cases we also computed probit estimates. The results are not reported here but are extremely
similar. The statistical inference from probit estimates is not diﬀerent than from logit.
21. We have also used the value of total plant and equipment as a size control. The results are virtually
unchanged, and thus not reported here.
22. These results are available upon request.
23. Throughout the paper we shall use the ·-notation to represent parameters that are kept constant during
the discussion at hand.
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Table 1: Percentage of Patents Won by Entrants in the Drugs and Medical Category, each Year for Diﬀerent
Definitions of Incumbency
Percentage of patents awarded to an entrant in a year
Winner of the race is an entrant if
Year patent youngest own citations is older than:
was awarded 20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 years
1975 76.26 76.26 78.58 81.61 85.53 90.41 98.32
1980 63.83 64.31 70.85 75.36 81.27 89.58 99.23
1985 63.94 65.48 73.61 78.35 83.00 89.55 97.15
1990 66.86 69.32 75.59 78.71 83.60 89.63 97.57
1995 62.94 65.42 72.88 76.53 81.89 89.72 97.96
1999 65.26 67.19 74.00 77.26 81.91 89.46 97.72
1975-1999 65.11 67.03 73.81 77.24 82.10 89.32 97.59
The percentages shown above are computed over 91,656 patents awarded between 1975 and 1999
in the US that are found in the NBER Patent Citations Data Files, in the technological category 3
(Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31,33 and 39.
Table 2: Comparison of the Citations Received by Patents Won by Entrants and by Incumbents in the Drugs
and medical Technological Category, for Diﬀerent Definitions of Incumbency
Panel A: Average citations received by patents
Winner of the race is an entrant if
Patents youngest own citations is older than:
awarded to: 20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 years
Entrants (μE) 4.29 4.25 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.21
Incumbents (μI) 4.10 4.16 4.32 4.37 4.40 4.53 4.99
Panel B: Diﬀerence of means test, assuming unequal variances.
Alternative hypothesis: μE − μI > 0
Winner of the race is an entrant if
youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 years
T statistic 3.103 1.336 -2.014 -2.563 -2.615 -3.370 -3.215
P-value 0.999 0.909 0.022 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.001
Panel C: Diﬀerence of means test, assuming unequal variances, and using citations
re-scaled by the average number of citations by grant year in the same technological field.
Alternative hypothesis: μE − μI > 0.
Winner of the race is an entrant if
youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year
T statistic -2.120 -2.857 -2.418 -2.970 -3.279 -3.948 -2.778
P-value 0.017 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002
The statistics shown above are computed over 91,656 patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 in the US
that are found in the NBER Patent Citations Data Files, in the technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical),
subcategories 31,33 and 39.
The factors for re-scaling are provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years
Variables N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
Dev. Dev. Dev.
1. Balance Sheet Items,
($ Billion), lagged
two years.
Incumbent’s assets 17,592 10.795 12.820 17,614 11.036 12.929 17,733 11.644 13.336
Entrant’s assets 16,909 4.275 7.107 16,887 4.559 7.331 16,768 5.248 7.870
Incumbent’s cash 11,641 1.544 2.655 12,122 1.607 2.709 13,402 1.731 2.807
Entrant’s cash 11,972 0.180 0.203 11,491 0.184 0.209 10,211 0.200 0.220
2. Patenting Experience
Incumbent’s average
accumulated patents
83,212 213.65 293.66 82,708 211.64 291.72 80,882 211.24 289.15
Entrant’s average
accumulated patents
68,759 94.20 205.70 69,940 100.92 214.91 74,431 114.59 230.99
3. Average number of
citations received by the
cited patents that area:
N Mean Std. Dev.
less than 1 year old 91,656 0.59 8.11
between 1 and 2 years old 91,656 6.67 53.21
between 2 and 3 years old 91,656 24.98 240.95
between 3 and 4 years old 91,656 42.37 319.13
between 4 and 5 years old 91,656 65.93 571.29
between 5 and 10 years old 91,656 345.32 2,203.93
between 10 and 20 years old 91,656 559.89 6,751.38
Total citations received by
the patenta
91,656 0.75 2.53
The sample includes all patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 in the US that are found in the NBER
Patent Citations Data Files, in the technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31,33
and 39, for which the assignee is found in COMPUSTAT.
a All counts of number of citations are re-scaled by the factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Logit Regressions of the Probability that the Winner is an Incumbent on
Incumbent’s and Entrants’ Measures of Financial Resources (I)
The dependent variable is the incumbent/entrant index, which equals 1 if the patent
was awarded to an incumbent, and zero if it was awarded to an entrant.
Regressors Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years
Incumbent’s cash, divided by 12.702∗∗∗ 13.457∗∗∗ 12.561∗∗∗ 10.944∗∗∗ 9.591∗∗∗ 7.142∗∗∗
total assets, lagged two years (1.360) (1.246) (1.024) (0.963) (0.932) (0.963)
Entrant’s cash, divided by -10.689∗∗∗ -10.460∗∗∗ -9.615∗∗∗ -9.450∗∗∗ -8.612∗∗∗ -7.837∗∗∗
total assets, lagged two years (1.425) (1.308) (0.987) (0.938) (0.894) (0.902)
Incumbent’s total assets 0.089∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.019 -0.121∗∗∗
($ Million), lagged two years (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028)
Entrants’ total assets -0.618∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ —0.529∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗
($ Million), lagged two years (0.072) (0.066) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.073)
Incumbent’s average 0.823e-2∗∗∗ 0.863e-2∗∗∗ 0.896e-2∗∗∗ 0.888e-2∗∗∗ 0.887e-2∗∗∗ 0.935e-2∗∗∗
accumulated patents (0.083e-2) (0.071e-2) (0.064e-2) (0.061e-2) (0.061e-2) (0.065e-2)
Entrant’s average -0.133∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
accumulated patents (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Total citations received by 0.140∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.087∗ 0.005 0.118∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗
the patenta (0.036) (0.046) (0.042) (0.050) (0.034) (0.058)
Average number of citations
received by the cited
patents that area:
less than 1 year old 0.906∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.202) (0.169) (0.150) (0.140) (0.160)
between 1 and 2 years old 0.022 -0.014 -0.056 -0.051∗ -0.035 0.030
(0.057) (0.047) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026)
between 2 and 3 years old -0.107∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ NA
(0.033) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
between 3 and 4 years old -0.139∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ NA NA
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
(continues)
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Table 4: continued.
The dependent variable is the incumbent/entrant index, which equals 1 if the patent
was awarded to an incumbent, and zero if it was awarded to an entrant.
Regressors Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
and regression statistics 20 years 10 years 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years
(continued)
Average number of citations
received by the cited
patents that area:
between 4 and 5 years old -0.187∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ NA NA NA
(0.027) (0.023) (0.024)
between 5 and 10 years old -0.328∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ NA NA NA NA
(0.026) (0.025)
between 10 and 20 years old -0.634∗∗∗ NA NA NA NA NA
(0.050)
Year dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,143 5,119 4,965 4,871 4,726 4,514
Likelihood ratio (χ2)c 5,887.93 5,569.17 4779.44 4,380.99 3,853.60 2,973.80
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.826 0.785 0.707 0.678 0.655 0.642
BRMR test of Heteroskedasticity (χ2)d 0.31 0.93 0.90 0.57 0.37 0.73
P-value 0.999 0.996 0.989 0.989 0.985 0.867
Proportion of entrant won 0.651 0.670 0.738 0.772 0.821 0.893
patents in full samplee
Proportion of entrant won 0.492 0.509 0.579 0.622 0.686 0.790
patents in estimation sample
The sample includes all patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 in the US that are found in the NBER
Patent Citations Data Files, in the technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31,33
and 39, for which the assignee is found in COMPUSTAT. The estimates are obtained by maximum
likelihood, from a logit regression of the probability that the winner of the race is an incumbent, on the
regressors shown above. Estimates of the standard errors are shown below the parameter estimate,
in parenthesis. Those followed by ∗∗∗ are significant to the 0.01 level, by ∗∗ to the 0.05 level,
and by ∗ to the 0.1 level.
a All counts of number of citations are re-scaled by the factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
b A dummy for 24 of the 25 years in the sample. Equals one when the observation corresponds to that year.
c The null hypothesis is that all the parameters in the model are equal to zero.
d The null hypothesis is that the model is homoskedastic. The model for hesteroskedasticity
specifies the variance of the logit error term as an exponential function of the citations received by
the patent and by the average of its cited patents of diﬀerent ages.
e The total number of patents in the sample before the match with COMPUSTAT is 91,656.
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Table 5: Marginal Eﬀects of Explanatory Variables on the Probability that the Incumbent Wins and their
Economic Significance
All estimates using the results reported in Table 4.
All estimates are computed at the sample median of all variables, unless noted.
Cash measure
lagged two years1
Cash measure
lagged three years1
Variables Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 20 years 10 years 5 years
Incumbent’s cash / assets1 0.808e-3 0.829e-3 0.614e-3 0.753e-3 0.781e-3 0.483e-3
∆P(1→9) a 0.5181 0.5426 0.4497 0.4767 0.4977 0.3588
Entrants’ cash /assets1 -0.209e-2 -0.198e-2 -0.148e-2 -0.214e-2 -0.205e-2 -0.128e-2
∆P(1→9) -0.3966 -0.3882 -0.3333 -0.3782 -0.3879 -0.2903
Incumbent’s average
accumulated patents
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Entrant’s average
accumulated patents
-0.032 -0.031 -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 -0.024
Total citations received
by the patentb
0.034 0.029 0.001 0.025 0.027 0.002
Average number of citations
received by the cited
patents that areb:
less than 1 year old 0.220 0.187 0.152 0.155 0.139 0.205
between 1 and 2 years old 0.005 -0.003 -0.012 0.003 -0.001 -0.013
between 2 and 3 years old -0.026 -0.033 -0.026 -0.021 -0.032 -0.034
between 3 and 4 years old -0.220 -0.037 -0.031 -0.022 -0.031 -0.035
between 4 and 5 years old -0.034 -0.051 -0.050 -0.030 -0.043 -0.055
between 5 and 10 years old -0.045 -0.094 NA -0.051 -0.087 NA
between 10 and 20 years old -0.080 NA NA -0.104 NA NA
The sample includes all patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 in the US that are found in the NBER
Patent Citations Data Files, in the technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31,33
and 39, for which the assignee is found in COMPUSTAT.
a ∆P(1→9) is the predicted average diﬀerence between the probability that the incumbent wins when the
incumbent’s or the entrant’s cash/assets correspond to the 9th and the 1st decile of their distributions.
b All counts of number of citations are re-scaled by the factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Logit Regressions of the Probability that the Winner is an Incumbent on
Incumbent’s and Entrants’ Measures of Financial Resources (II)
The dependent variable is the incumbent/entrant index, which equals 1 if the patent
was awarded to an incumbent, and zero if it was awarded to an entrant.
Cash measure
lagged two years1
Cash measure
lagged three years1
Regressors Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 20 years 10 years 5 years
Incumbent’s cash, divided by 17.540∗∗∗ 18.104∗∗∗ 15.649∗∗∗ 16.305∗∗∗ 15.740∗∗∗ 12.372∗∗∗
total assets1 (1.274) (1.086) (0.937) (1.156) (1.011) (0.867)
Incumbent’s cash interacted -2.224∗∗ -2.251∗∗∗ -2.176∗∗∗ -2.414∗∗∗ -1.862∗∗∗ -1.400∗∗∗
with the number of citations (0.958) (0.547) (0.341) (0.429) (0.375) (0.329)
Entrant’s cash, divided by -18.905∗∗∗ -19.657∗∗∗ -18.486∗∗∗ -19.408∗∗∗ -19.561∗∗∗ -17.984∗∗∗
total assets1; (1.375) (1.037) (1.607) (1.204) (1.012) (0.905)
Entrant’s cash interacted 0.384 1.109∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.041∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗
with the number of citations (1.164) (0.455) (0.264) (0.580) (0.355) (0.304)
Incumbent’s total assets 0.138∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.056∗∗∗ 0.032 0.104∗∗∗
($ Million)1 (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024)
Entrants’ total assets -1.212∗∗∗ -1.263∗∗∗ -1.204∗∗∗ -1.322∗∗∗ -1.334∗∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗
($ Million)1 (0.073) (0.066) (0.057) (0.058) (0.067) (0.076)
Incumbent’s average 0.404e-2∗∗∗ 0.482e-2∗∗∗ 0.471e-2∗∗∗ 0.409e-2∗∗∗ 0.456e-2∗∗∗ 0.427e-2∗∗∗
accumulated patents (0.046e-2) (0.040e-2) (0.036e-2) (0.042e-2) (0.036e-2) (0.032e-2)
Entrant’s average -0.179e-3∗∗∗ -0.105e-3∗∗∗ 0.008e-3 -0.179e-3∗∗∗ -0.087e-3∗ 0.039e-3
accumulated patents (0.063e-3) (0.055e-3) (0.050e-3) (0.056e-3) (0.048e-3) (0.042e-3)
Total citations received by 0.727∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗
the patenta (0.147) (0.081) (0.054) (0.094) (0.034) (0.055)
Average number of citations
received by the cited
patents that area:
less than 1 year old 1.074∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.145) (0.120) (0.172) (0.145) (0.127)
between 1 and 2 years old 0.077 0.030 0.024 0.035 0.026 0.006
(0.051) (0.036) (0.028) (0.048) (0.036) (0.028)
between 2 and 3 years old -0.076∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019)
(continues)
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Table 6: continued.
Panel A: the dependent variable is the incumbent/entrant index, which equals 1 if the patent
was awarded to an incumbent, and zero if it was awarded to an entrant.
Cash measure
lagged two years1
Cash measure
lagged three years1
Regressors Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
and regression statistics 20 years 10 years 5 years 20 years 10 years 5 years
Average number of citations
received by the cited
patents that area:
between 3 and 4 years old -0.080∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017)
between 4 and 5 years old -0.134∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
between 5 and 10 years old -0.328∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ NA -0.349∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ NA
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
between 10 and 20 years old -0.907∗∗∗ NA NA -0.836∗∗∗ NA NA
(0.050) (0.045)
Year dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,143 5,119 4,965 5,431 5,400 5,245
Likelihood Ratio (χ2)c 4,807.11 4,073.30 3,160.69 5,111.88 4,375.59 3,417.10
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.674 0.574 0.467 0.679 0.796 0.480
BRMR test of Heteroskedasticity (χ2)d 1.48 0.60 0.68 1.33 1.83 0.74
P-value 0.993 0.999 0.995 0.995 0.969 0.994
Proportion of entrant won 0.651 0.670 0.738 0.651 0.670 0.738
patents in full samplee
Proportion of entrant won 0.492 0.509 0.579 0.493 0.513 0.584
patents in estimation sample
Panel B: estimates of marginal eﬀects. All estimates are computed at the sample median of all variables, unless noted.
1Lagged two years 1Lagged three years
Variables Winner is an entrant if youngest own citations is older than:
20 years 10 years 5 years 20 years 10 years 5 years
Incumbent’s cash / assets1 0.100e-2 0.101e-2 0.079e-2 0.648e-3 0.904e-3 0.561e-3
∆P(1→9) 0.5894 0.6005 0.5156 0.4048 0.5385 0.4025
Entrants’ cash / assets1 -0.120e-2 -0.118e-2 -0.099e-2 -0.085e-2 -0.120e-2 -0.086e-2
∆P(1→9) 0.6211 0.6195 0.5994 0.458 0.6145 0.5629
Notes: same as Table 4.
∆P(1→9) is the predicted average diﬀerence between the probability that the incumbent wins when the
incumbent’s or the entrant’s cash/assets correspond to the 9th and the 1st decile of their distributions.
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